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Abstract
This paper provides a model of the market for news where prot maximizing me-
dia outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The results
show that, when information acquisition is costly, citizens nd it optimal to acquire
information from a media outlet with an editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences.
At the same time, there is always an upper bound on the possible extremismof an
editor above which the citizensdemand for news is strictly decreasing. Depending on
the distribution of citizensideological preferences, a media outlet may choose to hire
a non-moderate editor even in a monopolistic market. Moreover, the higher the degree
of competition in the market for news, the more likely it is that media outlets will hire
non-moderate editors. Finally, less moderate editors are more likely to be hired in a
news market where the opportunity cost of acquiring information for citizens is low.
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Whatever the social e¤ects of talk radio or the partisan agendas of certain hosts, it is
a fallacy that political talk radio is motivated by ideology. It is not. Political talk radio is
a business, and it is motivated by revenue. The conservatism that dominates todays AM
airwaves does so because it generates high Arbitron ratings, high ad rates, and maximum
prots.David Foster Wallace, Consider the Lobster and Other Essays, 2005
1 Introduction
In regulating the market for news in the US, the Federal Communication Commission pur-
sues three strategic policy goals: competition, diversity and localism.1 Despite the self-
evident importance for democratic decision-making of fostering an e¢ cient market of infor-
mation, such policy goals still lack an exhaustive theoretical foundation and a comprehensive
analysis of their consequences on consumerswelfare and optimal media ownerships rules.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the market for news in general and these
policy goals in particular, by providing a theoretical framework to analyze the relationship
between two of them: competition and diversity. More specically, this paper is the rst to
show the presence of a direct link between competition and diversity in a market for news
where consumers are rational (i.e., they do not derive any exogenous utility from receiving
biased information), they share the same prior beliefs and media outlets are just prot-
maximizers. Overall, the analysis suggests that a higher degree of competition leads to
more viewpoint diversity in the form of di¤erent media outlets hiring editors with di¤erent
ideological preferences.
The model analyses a market for news driven by the citizensdemand for information.
More specically, citizens have to choose between two alternative candidates (or policies).
Citizens di¤er in their idiosyncratic preferences, but all equally value the valence (i.e., qual-
ity) of alternative candidates (or public benet of alternative policies). Citizens may acquire
some information about the quality of di¤erent candidates by watching news reports. News
reports are produced by editors hired by media outlets from the population of citizens. That
is, once hired by a media outlet, a citizen-editor can gather (costly) information about the
candidatesquality and then report it to the viewers.
The results show that editors with di¤erent idiosyncratic preferences have di¤erent optimal
information acquisition strategies. A moderate editor (i.e., one who is ex-ante indi¤erent
between the two candidates) uses a balanced information acquisition strategy. The amount
of evidence in support of the leftist candidate that she requires in order to stop collecting
information and produce a report in favor of such candidate is the same as the one she
requires to produce a report in favor of the rightist candidate. Instead, a non-moderate
editor acquires information in a slanted way. That is, a small amount of evidence in support
1Source: http://www.fcc.gov/mediagoals/
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of the leftist candidate is su¢ cient to induce a leftist editor to stop investing in information
acquisition and produce a report in favor of that candidate. On the other hand, such an
editor would produce a report in favor of the rightist candidate only after having collected
a large amount of evidence in support of that candidate. Moreover, on average, the more
moderate an editor is, the higher the expected accuracy of its news reports (i.e., higher
probability of endorsing the high valence candidate).
In order to access news reports, citizens have to pay an opportunity cost. Hence, in
choosing whether or not to watch a media outlet report, and if so, which of them to watch,
a citizen will take into account two di¤erent components. She will consider how much
information the editor of a media outlet may have collected before producing a news report.
At the same time, she will also take into account how valuable the information gathered
by an editor could be for her nal choice. In turn this implies that di¤erent citizens have
di¤erent rationales for acquiring information from a like-minded source. Specically, the
model points out the presence of two rationales explaining why citizens nd optimal to watch
a media outlet whose editor has similar idiosyncratic preferences. From the perspective of
very liberal or very conservative citizens, a like-minded source of information is the only
source of information that could be pivotal for their choice. That is, these citizens would
never change their ex-ante ranking of preferences over candidates upon observing a report
coming from a moderate editor. Only a report of a like-minded editor in favor of the
ideologically least preferred candidate would contain enough evidence to convince these
citizens to choose such a candidate. On the other hand, when choosing between a media
outlet with a moderate editor and one with an ideologically closer editor, moderate-liberal
and moderate-conservative citizens will trade-o¤ the expected accuracy and the value of
information provided by these di¤erent types of editors. Citizens knows that a moderate
editor is the one who, in expectation, will produce the most accurate news report. However,
an ideologically-closer editor has a lower probability of endorsing the ideologically-farther
candidate by mistake. Thus, moderate-liberal and moderate-conservative citizens prefer to
acquire information from a like minded editor since they care more about not choosing a
low-valence ideologically-farther candidate than not choosing a low-valence ideologically-
closer one. Therefore, the model shows that citizens nd it optimal to acquire information
from a media outlet having an editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences even though
they do not have any exogenous preferences for like-minded sources of information. At the
same time, since the less moderate an editor is, the lower the expected accuracy of her news
reports (i.e., higher probability of endorsing the low valence candidate), there is always an
upper bound on the possible extremismof an editor above which the demand for news of
citizens is strictly decreasing.
Media outlets anticipate this behavior by citizens and hence they choose which editor to
hire taking into account the expected demand for news reports produced by editors with
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di¤erent idiosyncratic preferences. That is, by choosing a more leftist, moderate or rightist
editor, media outlets implicitly choose their product location in the political space. When
the distribution of citizens is such that the number of leftist and rightist citizens is higher
than the number of moderate ones, a media outlet may choose to hire a non-moderate editor
even in a monopolistic market. Hence, even though citizens do not derive any exogenous
utility from acquiring biased information and the media outlet is just maximizing prots,
the endogenous acquisition of costly information may induce the media outlet to choose an
editor whose optimal information acquisition strategy is slanted in favor of the alternative
ex-ante preferred by a subset of citizens. This is true even in the case where all citizens
share the same ex-post ranking of preferences over candidates.
It is also shown that, even in the case where citizens are uniformly distributed in the
policy space, there is a threshold in the number of media outlets present in the market
for news above which media outlets may nd optimal to hire non-moderate editors. More
specically, the lower the opportunity cost of watching news, the more likely it is that media
outlets would hire non-moderate editors for a given number of media outlets present in the
market for news.
Overall, the results suggest that more moderate editors should be present in news markets
where the opportunity cost that citizens incur to access information is high. Indeed, when
opportunity cost is high, the expected benet of watching news reports for extremist
citizens is lower than the cost. Hence, media outlets will be more likely to hire moderate
editors since the bulk of the demand for news comes from moderate citizens. Instead, when
the opportunity cost is low, even extremist citizens may nd convenient to watch news
reports when such news reports come from an editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences.
Hence, a media outlet may nd it optimal to locate its news product to capture this demand
for news by non-moderate citizens (i.e., hire a non-moderate editor). A clear application
of such a result is represented by the market for news in the broadcast media sector with
respect to the press. The opportunity cost of watching a broadcast media report is arguably
lower than the one of reading a newspaper. The analysis thus suggests that more moderate
editors should be present in the press than in the broadcast media sector. At the same time,
extremistcitizens should be more likely to acquire information from broadcast media than
from newspapers and broadcast media should face a higher overall demand with respect to
the one faced by the press.
1.1 Related Literature
A recent empirical literature has shown the presence of systematic bias in the market for
news using a variety of instruments to measure such bias (e.g., Grosenclose and Milyo 2005,
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Ho and Quinn 2008, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010).2 In parallel, a fast growing theoretical
literature has tried to rationalize the presence of such systematic bias in the media.3 This
literature has identied, so far, two di¤erent forces creating a bias in media reports. The
rst one is a supply-driven bias: media bias may arise from the idiosyncratic preferences
of journalists (Baron 2006), owners (Djankov et al. 2003, Anderson and McLaren 2010),
governments (Besley and Prat 2006), lobbies (Sobbrio 2010, Petrova 2011) or advertisers
(Ellman and Germano 2009, Germano and Meier 2010, Blasco et al. 2011).4 The second
one is a demand-driven bias. Part of this literature assumes that consumers like to receive
information conrming their bias and thus media just reect and conrm the bias of their
audience (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). On the other hand, Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2006) show that even when consumers do not like biased information, if media outlets have
reputation concerns and there is uncertainty on the quality of media outlets, in presence of
heterogeneous prior beliefs di¤erent media outlets may nd it optimal to slant their reports
according to the prior beliefs of di¤erent segments of consumers. Finally, Chan and Suen
(2008) show that media slant emerges when media outlets observe the state of the world
but are exogenously constrained to report coarse information.
The present paper contributes to this literature along three main dimensions. First, the
model provides a demand-driven rationale for the presence of slant in the market for news,
without relying on any exogenous preferences for biased news conrming individualsbe-
liefs (as in Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) and without heterogeneous prior beliefs (as in
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). In my model, the individuals willingness to acquire infor-
mation from a like-minded source is the result of the cost of acquiring information and the
endogenous acquisition of information by citizen-editors. Second, while in Chan and Suen
(2008) any media outlet is implicitly assumed to exogenously commit to a signal-threshold
above which it endorses a candidate, in my model any editor has a (credible) endogenous
commitment to her optimal information acquisition strategy. That is, as in the literature on
citizen-candidates voters know that a candidate can only credibly commit to her preferred
policy, in the present paper viewers know that a media outlets editor can only credibly
commit to her optimal stopping thresholds. In addition, di¤erently from Chan and Suen
where viewers can only learn coarse information from a media outlet (i.e., they are just
able to infer in which interval lies the signal observed by the media outlet), in the present
framework viewers always learn the underlying (di¤erence of) signals collected by an ed-
itor.5 Moreover, in Chan and Suen, competition does not lead to product di¤erentiation
2For evidence on the empirical e¤ects of media bias see DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Gerber et al.
(2009) and DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010).
3See Prat and Strömberg (2011) for an extensive survey of the literature on the political economy of
mass media.
4See also Duggan and Martinelli (2010) for a model where ideological media strategically select which
issues to cover.
5From the viewersperspective, it is equivalent whether the editor produces a coarse news report (e.g.,
endorsment) or she produces a news report showing all the signals (e.g., evidence) collected. Indeed, upon
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(i.e., two independent prot-maximizing media outlets always choose the same endorsement
threshold). Instead, my results show that competing media outlets may nd optimal to
choose editors with di¤erent idiosyncratic preferences.6 Third, as pointed out by Prat and
Strömberg (2011), the relationship between the ideological positions of media outlets and
the informativeness of their news reports is still theoretically unclear. By micro-founding the
information acquisition process of citizen-editors, the model is able to provide novel insights
on this issue. Specically, the results show that the expected accuracy of news reports (i.e.,
expected probability of an editor endorsing the high valence candidate) is decreasing mov-
ing away from moderate editors. In turn, this implies that there is always an upper bound
on the possible extremismof an editor above which the demand for news by citizens is
strictly decreasing.
The results are consistent with the empirical results of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).
Using zip-code level data on newspaper circulation in the US, they show that the demand
for right-wing newspaper is higher in markets with a higher proportion of Republicans.
Moreover, they nd that ownership has little or no role in media slant.7 The present paper
suggests that such ndings may not be the result of behavioral preferences for biased news
but they may rather be the result of the demand for costly information by rational individuals
and the consequent optimal ideological location of news by prot maximizing media outlets.8
The theoretical framework of the paper is also closely related to the empirical analysis of
newspaper endorsements and media inuence in the US by Chiang and Knight (2010). In
line with the predictions of my model, Chiang and Knight nd that the degree of inuence
of a newspaper on voters depends on the credibility of the endorsement.9
Formally, the structure of information acquisition by citizen-editors is related to the model
of Brocas and Carrillo (2009) on systematic errors in decision-making. In their setting for any
exogenous amount of information, all individuals choose the same action while in presence
of endogenous information acquisition di¤erent individuals have di¤erent probabilities of
choosing a given action. More specically, they show that individuals favor actions with
large payo¤-variance. My setting di¤ers because it is assumed that all actions have the
same variance in payo¤s for any citizen-editor and such variance is equal across citizen-
editors. Moreover, in my model citizen-editors di¤er in their ex-ante ranking of actions even
observing a coarse news report, viewers are able to infer which stopping threshold has been reached by the
editor since they know the editors idyosincratic preferences.
6On the other hand, Chan and Suen (2008) endogenize the platform of political parties in their model
and provide several interesting insights also on the role of media on partisan policies.
7More specically, they nd that the slant of co-owned papers is only weakly (and statistically insignif-
icantly) correlated to a newspapers political alignment(Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010, page 38).
8Calvert (1985) was the rst to point out the positive value of a biased source of information for a rational
decision-maker. See also Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) and Li and Suen (2004).
9Specically, endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-leaning newspapers are less inuential
than are endorsements from neutral or right-leaning newspapers and likewise for endorsements for the
Republican candidate(Chiang and Knight, 2010, page 23).
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when they share the same ex-post ordinal preferences over actions.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the structure of
the game. Section 3 derives the optimal information acquisition strategy by citizen-editors.
Section 4 discusses the demand for news. Section 5 contains the results on the optimal
choice of editors by media outlets. Section 6 provides a discussion on the implications
and the robustness of the results. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are provided in the
appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Citizens
There is a continuum of citizens of measure one who have to make a decision regarding
a single issue or policy P . Without loss of generality, the policy space is assumed to be
	 = [0; 1]. There are only two possible alternative candidates/policies L and R (i.e., P =
fL;Rg) where L = 0 and R = 1: There are two possible states of the world s 2 fl; rg : To
preserve symmetry, the common prior belief that the state of the world is r is assumed to
be Pr(s = r) = 1=2: Citizens care about the ideological distance between their idiosyncratic
preferences and the candidatespolicy platforms. That is, citizens want to minimize the
euclidean distance between their policy preferences and the ones of the chosen candidate.
At the same time, citizens also care about the valence (i.e., quality) of the candidates.
The valence component is captured by an additive constant in the citizens utility function.
That is, regardless of her idiosyncratic policy preferences, each citizen gets an extra positive
payo¤when she chooses the high valence candidate and a negative one when the low valence
candidate is chosen.11 Hence, citizen is utility function is:
ui(P; xi) = IsIp   jP   xij (1)
where xi represents the idiosyncratic policy preference of citizen i: Moreover, without loss
of generality  2 (0; 1
2
] and:
Is =
(
1 if s = l
 1 if s = r and Ip =
(
1 if P = L
 1 if P = R (2)
10Notice also that in their model the cost of acquiring information is embedded in the discount factor.
Their results do not apply in presence of a per unit cost of sampling since individuals di¤er only in the
variance of their payo¤s but not in their ex-ante ranking between actions.
11As usual in the literature on the demand for news (e.g., Strömberg 2004, Mullainathan and Shleifer
2005, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, Chan and Suen 2008, Anderson and McLaren 2010) it is assumed that
citizens receive utility from choosing a given candidate/alternative per se. Section 6.2 provides a discussion
on this assumption.
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As a consequence, candidate L gives a higher utility to citizens when the state of the world
is l than when the state is r (viceversa for candidate R).12 In other words, while L and R
represent the alternative political platforms of the two candidates, 2 can be seen as the
di¤erence in the valence of the two candidates in each state of the world.13 The idiosyncratic
preferences of citizens are distributed with a common knowledge c.d.f. F (x) with density
function f(x) where supp [f(x)] = [0; 1]. To avoid the presence of exogenous asymmetries,
the analysis focuses on distributions that are symmetric and monotone in the sub-intervals
x 2 [0; 1
2
] and x 2 [1
2
; 1]:14 The state contingent utilities of citizen i are, thus, as follows:
ui(Ljs) =
(
   xi if s = l
    xi if s = r
and ui(Rjs) =
(
  + xi   1 if s = l
 + xi   1 if s = r
(3)
Notice also that for any citizen i the two candidates have the same variance in payo¤s and
such variance is equal across citizens since:
ui(Ljs = l)  ui(Ljs = r) = ui(Rjs = r)  ui(Rjs = l) = 2 8i
Let  = fl; rg be the signal space. The signal likelihood function is as follows:
Pr(ljs = l) = Pr(rjs = r) =  (4)
where  2  1
2
; 1

represents the precision of the signal. Suppose now that citizens receive nl
signals l and nr signals r on the state of the world. Then the citizensposterior beliefs
are:
Pr(s = rjnl; nr) = 
nr nl
nr nl + (1  )nr nl
Therefore, denoting n = nr   nl, the citizensposterior beliefs can be denoted as follows:
(n) =
1
1 +
 
1 

n (5)
Hence, citizen i prefers candidate R to candidate L whenever:
(n) >
1
4
(2   2xi + 1) = (n^i) = ^i (6)
That is n^i is the di¤erence in the number of signals in favor of state r which makes citizen
i being indi¤erent between candidates R and L: Notice that for  = 1
2
, then ^i  0;8i.
12For a similar specication of the votersutility function see, for example, Aragones and Palfrey (2002).
13As an alternative interpretation of the model, L and R can be seen as two alternative policies (e.g.
implementing Kyotos protocol or not). Hence, if the state of the world is l then the public benets/cost
ratio of policy L is higher than the one of R (viceversa if s = r). That is, if the state of the world is l policy
L is the most e¢ cient one.
14For example, the families of Uniform, Normal, and Cauchy distribution functions satisfy such property.
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Hence for  = 1
2
all citizens would prefer candidate L when s = l and candidate R when
s = r: That is, when  = 1
2
; ex-post all citizens have the same ranking of preferences over
candidates. Instead, for 0 <  < 1
2
there will be some stubborncitizens who will always
vote for the same candidate regardless of the state of the world.15 Moreover:
@ui(Rj(n))
@(n)
=  @ui(Lj(n))
@(n)
= 2, 8i
that is, the utility functions of citizens i and j are always parallel. For any exogenously
given (n) 2 (0; 1); di¤erent citizens may have di¤erent ranking of preferences regarding
candidates L and R. More specically:
^ 1
2
=
1
2
and
@^i
@xi
< 0 (7)
Thus, citizens with more rightistpreferences require less evidence in favor of R in order
to choose that candidate with respect to moderate citizens. Moreover, when a citizen cares
more about the true state of the world (i.e., when the valence component is larger), her
indi¤erence threshold is closer to the one of a moderate citizen. That is:
@^i
@
=
(2xi   1)
42
(
< 0 if xi < 12
> 0 if xi > 12
(8)
That is, the more citizens care about the quality of di¤erent candidates, the less evidence
in favor of the ideologically-farther candidate they require in order to vote for her. The
utilities of citizens can then be represented as a function of their idiosyncratic preferences
xi and their posterior beliefs:
ix
)0( =nuRxi)0( =nu
L
xi
 1
)1( =nuRxi
)1( =nuLxi
-1/2
Figure 1. Expected Utility of citizens for n = 0 and n = 1
15Notice that assuming  2 (0; 12 ] is without loss of generality. The same results would hold in a model
where  2 R+ and supp [f(x)] = R:
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Clearly, the expected utility of choosing the leftist (rightist) candidate is lower (higher) the
more rightist a citizen is. The black thick line represents the expected utility of citizens
given their prior beliefs (i.e., for (n = 0) = 1=2): The red thin line instead represents
the expected utility of citizens when they have observed an extra signal in favor of R (i.e.,
for (n = 1) > 1=2): Any extra signal in favor of R shifts upward the expected utility of
choosing R while it shifts downward the expected utility from choosing L. Viceversa, as
shown by the following graph, any extra signal in favor if L shifts upward the expected
utility of choosing L while it leads to a downward shift in the expected utility of choosing
R:
  1
)1( -=nuRxi
)0( =nuRxi)0( =nu
L
xi
)1( -=nuLxi
ix
-1/2
Figure 2. Expected Utility of citizens for n = 0 and n =  1
2.2 The Game
There is a media industry composed by K  1 media outlets. Each media outlet is assumed
to be maximizing its viewership in order to maximize its advertising revenues. In order
to produce news reports, each media outlet has to hire an editor from the population of
citizens. Once hired, a citizen-editor is endowed with a (costly) technology that allows her
to collect evidence on the state of the world. More specically, an editor has to incur a cost
c any time she decides to draw a signal on the state of the world (e.g., e¤ort she has to exert
to acquire information, opportunity cost of sending reporters to investigate an issue, etc.).16
The citizen-editor will then produce a news report based on the evidence collected. Citizens
will then decide whether to access a media outlets report by paying an opportunity cost
C or not. If they decide to watch a media outlets report they update their beliefs using
Bayesrule. Hence, the demand for news reports that a media outlet faces is a function of
the type of editor that it has hired. That is, given an editor with idiosyncratic preferences
16By editorI refer to what is usually called Editor-in-Chieffor a newspaper and Managing Editor
in the broadcast media sector. More in general, the model applies to the choice of a prot maximizing media
outlet regarding the type of journalists to be hired.
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xe; the prot function of media outlet k is k(xe) = Dk(xe); where Dk(xe) is the demand
for the news report produced by the media outlet.17 To summarize, the timing of the game
is as follows:
Citizens decide whether
to watch a media outlet’s
report and if so, update
their beliefs.
Media outlets choose
their editors from the
population of citizens
Nature draws
state of the
world l or r
Each editor samples
and then produces a
news report
Citizens choose their
preferred candidate.
Payoffs are realized
Figure 3. Timing of the Game
Next section provides the analysis of the optimal strategy of a citizen-editor (i.e., her optimal
sampling strategy). Then, I characterize the demand for news reports by citizens (i.e.,
Dk(xe)) as a function of an editors optimal sampling strategy. Finally, I analyze the prot-
maximizing strategy of media outlets within di¤erent structures of the market for news (i.e.,
which type of editor maximizes the prots of media outlets in a monopoly, duopoly and in
presence of an arbitrary number of media outlets) and then discuss the results.
3 Optimal Information Acquisition by Citizen-Editors
Suppose that a media outlet has hired a citizen with idiosyncratic preferences xe to work
as its editor (i.e., xe denotes the idiosyncratic preferences of a citizen-editor). Let e;m(n)
be the decision of such a citizen-editor given that she has already drawn m = f0; 1; :::::1g
signals and given a current di¤erence of signals in favor of r equal to n. Given any m and n;
the choice set of citizen-editor e is  m(n) = fL;R; dg: Thus she can choose candidate L or R
or she can pay c and draw another signal on the state of the world (i.e., choose e;m(n) = d;
where d stands for draw).
An editor faces a trade-o¤ between the cost of acquiring a signal and the utility she gets
from the informative content of each signal. Thus, her problem is thus to nd an optimal
stopping rule. More specically, the value function that editor e maximizes after m draws;
given a current di¤erence of signals in favor of state r equal to n; is the following:
Ve(n) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
max
(
(1  2(n))  xe;
(n)Ve(n+ 1) + (1  (n))Ve(n  1)  c
)
if (n) < ^e
max
(
(2(n)  1)  (1  xe);
(n)Ve(n+ 1) + (1  (n))Ve(n  1)  c
)
if (n)  ^e
(9)
where (n) = (n) + (1   (n))(1   ): In other words, if after m draws editor e has a
posterior (n) < ^e she will decide either to stop acquiring signals and choose candidate
17See section 6.3 for a discussion on the structure of media outletsprots.
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L with an expected payo¤ of (1   (n)) (   xe) + (n)(    xe) or paying c and getting
another signal. In this case, with probability  the editor will get signal r in which case the
value function becomes Ve(n+1) and with probability (1  ) she will get signal l in which
case the value function becomes Ve(n  1): Instead, if after m draws editor e has a posterior
(n)  ^e she will decide either to stop acquiring information and choose candidate R with
an expected payo¤ of (1   (n)) (xe      1) + (n)(xe +    1) or paying c and getting
another signal. In this case, with probability  the editor will get signal r in which case
the value function becomes Ve(n + 1) and with probability (1   ) she will get signal l
in which case the value function becomes Ve(n   1): Notice also that the value function of
editor e does not depend on how many draws she has already done (i.e., m), since the only
relevant variable for her decision is the current di¤erence of signals in favor of r (i.e., the
state variable is n):
The following proposition characterizes the properties of the optimal information acqui-
sition strategy by an editor.
Proposition 1 For all c > 0, there exist (ne; n

e) such that for 8m; 8xe:
1. e;m(n) = L if n  ne; e;m(n) = R if n  ne and e;m(n) = d if n 2 (ne; ne):
2. dn

e
dxe
< 0;
dne
d
< 0 and dn

e
dc
> 0
3. dn

e
dxe
< 0; dn

e
d
> 0 and dn

e
dc
< 0
Moreover
dnedxe

8>>>><>>>>:
<
dnedxe  for xe < 12
=
dnedxe  for xe = 12
>
dnedxe  for xe > 12
and
dned

8>>>><>>>>:
<
dned  for xe < 12
=
dned  for xe = 12
>
dned  for xe > 12
The following graph illustrates the optimal strategy of editor e after m draws, given a
current di¤erence of signals in favor of r equal to n:
Rnme =)(,tLnme =)(,t
*
en
*
en¥- ¥
dnme =)(,t
Figure 4. Optimal Strategy of editor e
In other words, ne is the threshold below which editor e does not sample anymore and
reports jnej more signals in favor of candidate L: Similarly, ne is the threshold above which
editor e does not sample anymore and reports ne more signals in favor of candidate R:
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For any given n a more rightisteditor is always more likely to produce a report in favor
of candidate R than in favor of L; with respect to a more leftisteditor. That is, xe0 > xe
implies that ne0 < n

e and n

e0 < n

e: Moreover, given editors e and e
0 with xe0 < xe  12 ; then
ne0   ne0 < ne   ne: That is, a more leftist editor requires even less signal in favor of L than
more in favor of R to stop sampling, with respect to a more moderate editor. Similarly,
given editors e and e0 with xe0 > xe  12 ; then ne0   ne0 < ne   ne: That is, a more rightist
editor requires even less signals in favor of R than more in favor of L with respect to a
more moderate editor. Hence, the more moderate an editor is, the larger is her information
acquisition setNe = fnje;m(n) = dg (i.e., the set of the di¤erence in the number of signals
in favor of r (or in favor of l) such that editor e will keep sampling).18 At the same time,
an increase in the importance of the valence component of the editors utility function ()
makes an editor sample more in both directions (i.e., Ne becomes larger). Moreover, an
increase in  induces a leftist editor to increase her leftist stopping rule more than her
rightiststopping rule (i.e., jnej increases more than ne). The opposite is true for a rightist
editor. That is, a higher  is associated with more sampling in both directions and more
symmetric stopping rules for all types of editors. Therefore, proposition 1 suggests that
when  is higher any type of editor: i) acquires more information; ii) behaves as if she were
more moderate (i.e., has more symmetric stopping rules).
Notice that, for xe = 12 ; n

e   n^e = n^e   ne and thus (ne) = 1   (ne): Moreover for
xe0 > xe:
(ne0) < (n

e) < 1=2 < (n

e0) < (n

e) (10)
Moreover, given the comparative statics results of proposition 1, it is possible to derive
some comparative statics results on the probability of an editor choosing the wrongcan-
didate.
Corollary 1 The expected probability of an editor choosing the low (high) valence candidate
is increasing (decreasing) in c and decreasing (increasing) in  and in jxe   P j : Moreover,
the more moderate an editor, the lower this probability.
As expected, when the cost of sampling is higher, editors will make more errorsin the
sense that they would be less likely to choose the high valence candidate. Instead, when
editors care more about the quality of candidates their probability of choosing the low valence
candidate decreases (since as shown by proposition 1, when  is higher editors acquire more
information). Moreover, this probability is decreasing in the ideological distancebetween
an editor and the candidate, e.g., more rightisteditors are less likely to choose candidate
L when the high quality one is R and are instead more likely to choose candidate R when
the high quality one is L: More generally, from an ex-ante perspective, moderate editors are
less likely to make a report in favor of the low quality candidate. This is due to the fact
18Notice that it is always the case that either Ne  ? or Ne  fne; ne + 1; ::::::; ne   1; neg  f0g :
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that, as shown by proposition 1, the more moderate an editor is, the more symmetric her
sampling strategy is and also the more information she acquires before making a decision.
Therefore, by taking on average a more informeddecision, moderate editors are less likely
to choose the low quality candidate. That is, the less moderate an editor is, the lower the
expected accuracy of her news reports (i.e., lower probability of endorsing the high valence
candidate)
At this point, it is important to remark that I am not implying in any way that moderate
editors have any higher intrinsic value per se. Moderate editors simply provide a useful
benchmark since their perfectly symmetric stopping thresholds correspond to what is usually
considered as a fair and balancednews report.19 Indeed, a moderate editor requires the
exact same amount of evidence in favor of either candidate to stop acquiring information and
choose that candidate. Hence, moderate editors are used as the benchmark for the discussion
throughout the paper simply because the idea of fair and balanced news reports may
implicitly suggests that rational citizens should always demand this type of news (i.e., there
should not be any media slant). Nevertheless, as indeed shown in the next section, these
fair and balancednews reports are not necessarily the optimal ones from the perspective
of every single citizen.
4 The Demand for News
This section analyzes the demand by citizens for the news reports of a media outlet as a
function of the optimal stopping rules of its editor. Given the idiosyncratic preferences of a
media outlets editor, each citizen i can infer the set of possible reports of a media outlet (i.e.,
citizen i knows that the editor will either stop acquiring information after having collected
ne signals in favor of L or n

e in favor of R): That is, analogously to the literature on citizen-
candidates where citizens know that a candidate has a personal commitment to implement
a given policy, in the model citizens know that an editor has a personal commitment to
implement a given information acquisition strategy.20 That is, from the citizensperspective,
it is equivalent whether the editor produces a coarse news report (e.g., endorsement) or she
produces a news report showing all the signals (e.g., evidence) collected. Indeed, upon
observing a coarse news report, citizens are able to infer which stopping threshold has been
reached by the editor since they know the editors idiosyncratic preferences. Moreover, this
stopping threshold contains all the information needed by citizens to update their beliefs
(i.e., the net di¤erence of signals in favor of a candidate).
Let the citizensaction space be A = fW;NWg where W stands for watching the news
19For example, the idea of fair and balancednews reports was at the foundation of the FCC Fairness
Doctrine in the US. Similarly, as stated by the BBC in the UK, Impartiality lies at the heart of public service
and is the core of the BBCs commitment to its audiences(www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines)
20See sections 6.3 and 6.5 for a discussion on this issue.
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reports and NW for not watching the news reports. Then, the expected utility of citizen i
from not getting any news report from the media outlet is:
Ui(NW ) =
(
Ui
 
Lj1
2

for xi < 12
Ui
 
Rj1
2

for xi > 12
If instead citizen i decides to pay a cost C to access the news report of an editor with
idiosyncratic preferences xe, her expected utility will be:
Ui(W;xe) = Pr(n = n

e)max fUi (Lj(ne)) ;Ui (Rj(ne))g
+ Pr(n = ne)max fUi (Lj(ne)) ;Ui (Rj(ne))g   C
(11)
Where the probabilities of reaching the two stopping threshold ne and n

e are:
21
Pr(n = ne) =
2(ne)  1
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
(12)
and
Pr(n = ne) =
1  2(ne)
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
(13)
Lets now focus on the marginal viewer. That is, the viewer who is indi¤erent between
watching and not watching the media outlets reports. More specically, there will be
two marginal viewers. One representing the most rightist citizen willing to watch news
reports from a media outlet having an editor with idiosyncratic preferences xe: The other
one representing the most leftist citizen willing to watch such news reports. That is, there
will be a x^e = x^e(xe) and a ~xe = ~xe(xe) with x^e < ~xe such that only citizens with xi 2 [x^e; ~xe]
will watch the news reports.22
Lets start analyzing the marginal viewer for xi < 12 : Then Ui(NW ) = Ui
 
Lj1
2

and since
by (10) ne < 0 < n

e; it must be the case that:
Ui (Lj(ne)) > Ui (Rj(ne))
Moreover, the following individual rationality constraint must be satised for leftist citizens:
Ui (Lj(ne)) < Ui (Rj(ne)) (IRL)
otherwise, if Ui (Lj(ne)) > Ui (Rj(ne)) (i.e., if citizen i would always prefer alternative L
regardless of watching or not the news reports) then watching the news reports would never
21These are simply the probabilities of hitting the two stopping thresholds in a stochastic process with
two absorbing states (see Brocas and Carrillo 2007). The online appendix provides a formal derivation of
these probabilities.
22Notice that it could also be the case that x^e > 12 or ~xe <
1
2 but not both.
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be ex-post rational given the cost C: Thus the marginal leftist viewer will be the one having
idiosyncratic preferences x^e such that:
Ui

L
12

=
2(ne)  1
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Lj(ne)) +
1  2(ne)
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Rj(ne))  C
that is:
x^e =
1
2
  (2(ne)  1) +
C
2Pr(n = ne)
(14)
Notice also that the ex-post rationality constraint (IRL) is satised as long as xi > 12  
(2(ne)   1) = xmin: Hence, since x^e > xmin, such constraint is automatically satised for
any citizen willing to watch the news reports.
Lets now focus on the marginal viewer for xi > 12 : Then Ui(NW ) = Ui
 
Rj1
2

and since
by (10) ne < 0 < n

e; it must be the case that:
Ui (Rj(ne)) > Ui (Lj(ne))
Moreover, the following individual rationality constraint must be satised for rightist citi-
zens:
Ui (Lj(ne)) > Ui (Rj(ne)) (IRR)
otherwise, if Ui (Lj(ne)) < Ui (Rj(ne)) (i.e., if citizen i would always prefer alternative
R regardless of watching or not the news reports) then watching the news reports would
not be ex-post rational given the cost C: Thus the marginal rightist viewer will be the one
having idiosyncratic preferences ~xe such that:
Ui

R
12

=
2(ne)  1
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Lj(ne)) +
1  2(ne)
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Rj(ne))  C
that is:
~xe =
1
2
+ (1  2(ne)) 
C
2Pr(n = ne)
(15)
Notice also that the ex-post rationality constraint (IRR) is satised as long as xi < 12 +
(1  2(ne)) = xmax: Hence, since ~xe < xmax, such constraint is automatically satised for
any citizen willing to watch the news reports. The following condition is assumed:
Assumption 1
C < Cmax = 
 
1   ne jxe=12
1 + 
ne jxe=12
!
where  = 1 

: It is easy to prove that when this assumption does not hold, there will
never be any leftist or rightist citizen willing to watch any news report. The following lemma
contains the main properties of the demand for news.
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Lemma 1 Let (ne; n

e) be the optimal stopping rules of an editor with idiosyncratic prefer-
ences xe:Then, (~xe   x^e) is decreasing in C and increasing in ; ne and jnej : Moreover, there
is always an upper bound on the extremismof an editor above which (~xe   x^e) is strictly
decreasing. Specically, ~xe is increasing in xe if and only if xe < xmaxeR where x
max
eR
2  1
2
; 1

is such that:
~C(ne(x
max
eR
); ne(x
max
eR
)) = C (16)
where d ~C(ne; n

e)=dxe < 0 and ~C(n

e; n

e) 2 (0; Cmax): Similarly, x^e is increasing in xe if and
only if xe > xmineL where x
min
eL
2 (0; 1
2
) is such that:
C^(ne(x
min
eL
); ne(x
min
eL
)) = C (17)
where dC^(ne; n

e)=dxe > 0 and C^(n

e; n

e) 2 (0; Cmax):
The above lemma summarizes the main features of the demand for news media by citizens.
Hence, it represents the main building-block for all the results that will be obtained in
the next section when discussing the optimal choice of editors by prot-maximizing media
outlets within a given market structure (i.e., monopoly, duopoly or an arbitrary number of
competing media outlets).
Obviously, a higher opportunity cost of watching news reports decreases the number of
leftist and rightist citizens willing to watch such reports. Instead, the higher the valence
component in the citizens utility function, the more leftist and rightist citizens will want
to watch news. That is, the more citizens care about knowing the state of the world, the
more citizens will get informed. At the same time, all citizens care about receiving the
most accurate information, i.e., the lower is ne and the higher is n

e; the more citizens
will want to get informed. Indeed, all citizens who value information (i.e., the ones whose
ex-post ranking of candidates is not always the same as their ex-ante one) would like to
watch a media outlet having an editor who samples in both directions until innity, since
the more information she gets, the higher the citizens expected utility. However, given
the editors cost of acquiring information and the opportunity cost that each citizen faces
when accessing this information, when a citizen is choosing whether to watch a media outlet
and/or choosing among alternative news media outlets, she takes into account two di¤erent
components. That is, she considers how similar an editors idiosyncratic preferences are to
hers (i.e., how valuable the information provided by an editor could be to her) but she
also values the expected accuracy of information acquisition by an editor (i.e., how much
information an editor is acquiring and thus providing, on average).
Specically, citizens can be divided into two categories depending on their idiosyncratic
preferences. Citizens with preferences xi < x^ejxe= 12 and xi > ~xejxe= 12 are relatively ex-
tremists.23 For these citizens, only a media outlet with an editor with similar idiosyncratic
23Notice that not all these citizens can be properly dened as extremists since not everyone of them
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preferences can be pivotal for their choice (i.e., they never nd valuable the information
coming from a moderate editor). Hence, either they will watch a media outlet with an
editor with (su¢ ciently) similar preferences or they will not watch any media outlet at all.
On the other hand, citizens with preferences xi 2
h
x^ejxe= 12 ;
1
2

[

1
2
; ~xejxe= 12
i
are rela-
tively moderate(i.e., liberal-moderates for x^ejxe= 12 < xi <
1
2
and conservative-moderates
for 1
2
< xi < ~xejxe= 12 ): These citizens nd the information coming from a moderate editor
valuable, but they may nd the information coming from an editor with similar idiosyn-
cratic preferences even more valuable. That is, these citizens face a basic trade-o¤ between
the objectivedi¤erence in the expected accuracy of news reports coming from di¤erent
types of editors and their subjectivevalue. A citizen could make two specular errors. She
may choose L when L is the low quality candidate. Similarly, she may choose R when R
is the low quality candidate. A moderate citizen (i.e., xi = 12) cares about these two errors
equally. Hence, she always prefers to watch a media outlet having a moderate editor since
such an editor minimizes the overall probability of making errors (see corollary 1). On the
other hand, for example, a liberal-moderate citizen cares more about not making the error
of choosing R when s = l: As shown by corollary 1, a liberal editor has a lower probability
of making such error but a higher probability of making a report in favor of L when s = r
and a higher overall probability of making errors. Hence, when choosing between a media
outlet with a moderate editor and one with an ideologically closer editor, any citizen will
trade-o¤the expected accuracy and the value of information provided by these di¤erent types
of editors.24 In turn, as shown by the above lemma, the presence of this trade-o¤ implies
that there will always be an upper bound on the extremismof an editor above which the
demand for news by rational citizens will be strictly decreasing. That is, depending on the
opportunity cost of acquiring information, rational liberal (conservative) citizens may prefer
a slightly more moderate-liberal (conservative) editor to a less moderate one.
Therefore, since ~xe is always increasing in xe for xe  1=2 and x^e is always increasing
in xe for xe  1=2; this rational framework is able to explain the presence of preferences
for like-minded sources of information. That is, the above lemma provides a rationale for
the presence of a demand for news coming from non-moderate editors. At the same time,
it also points out that rational citizens would never nd optimal to demand news coming
from very ideological editors since the expected accuracy of such editors is very low. Hence,
behavioral models (as the one of Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) remain probably better
suited to explain the presence of a demand for news coming from extremist editors.
The following section analyzes the implications of such demand for news for the optimal
choice of editors by prot maximizing media outlets.
is stubborn. Some of them may change their ex-ante ranking of preferences over candidates if they receive
enough information in favor of the ideologically least preferred candidate (notice that, as pointed out in
section 2, for  = 12 everyone would do so upon knowing the true state of the world).
24Durante and Knight (2010) analyze the demand for news in Italy. They show that, indeed, when the
ideological position of a media outlet changes, viewers change their choice of news programs accordingly.
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5 Optimal Choice of Editors by Media
5.1 Monopoly
This section analyzes the implications of the citizen-editors model in a monopolistic market.
The media outlets owner wants to choose xe to maximize viewership. Choosing an editor
from the population of citizens is analogous to choosing a product location on the [0; 1]
line. Suppose the media outlets owner chooses an editor with idiosyncratic preferences xe:
Then, the prot function is:
(xe; x^e; ~xe) = D(xe; x^e; ~xe) = F (~xe)  F (x^e)
where F (~xe) and F (x^e) are increasing functions of xe: Hence, the media outlet owner will
choose an editor with preferences xmone such that:
d(xe)
dxe

xe=xmone
= 0
The following proposition characterizes under which conditions a prot-maximizing media
outlet will hire a moderate editor and under which conditions it will hire a non-moderate
one.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is just a monopolist prot-maximizing media outlet in the
market for news. For any symmetric f(x), then:
1. If
@f(x)
@x
8<:  0 for x 
1
2
 0 for x > 1
2
(18)
then the media outlet will always hire a moderate editor (i.e., xmone =
1
2
).
2. If
@f(x)
@x
8<: < 0 for x <
1
2
> 0 for x  1
2
(19)
then the media outlet will always hire a non-moderate editor with preferences xmone 2
xmineL ;
1
2
 [  1
2
; xmaxeR

The above proposition shows that a monopolist media outlet will always choose a moderate
editor when citizens are distributed uniformly or when the mass of moderate citizens is higher
than the one of non-moderate ones. Instead, if the number of moderate citizens is lower
than the one of non-moderate ones, the media outlet will prefer to hire a non-moderate
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editor. Indeed, in such a case the media outlet may increase its demand since many non-
moderate citizens are willing to watch its news reports. At the same time, most moderate
citizens will still want to acquire information from such a source rather than not acquiring
any information at all.
Hence, when the media outlet is just maximizing prots, even though citizens do not
derive any exogenous utility from biased information, the endogenous acquisition of costly
information may induce a media outlet to choose an editor whose optimal information
acquisition strategy is slanted in favor of the alternative ex-ante preferred by a subset of
citizens (e.g., the rightists one).
However, even in this case the optimal editor will not be too extremist. Non-moderate
citizens will indeed trade-o¤ the benet of having an editor with similar preferences and
the cost of having an editor who will sample relatively less, i.e., whose news reports have a
lower expected accuracy. Hence, as shown by lemma 1, after some point, choosing a more
rightist (leftist) editor will decrease even the number of rightist (leftist) citizens willing to
watch the media outlet, i.e., for xe > xmaxeR (xe < x
min
eL
).
5.2 Duopoly
Suppose now that K = 2: That is, the market for news is composed of two prot maximizing
media outlets. The following proposition summarizes the possible Nash equilibria that can
arise in this case depending on the distribution of citizenspreferences.25
Proposition 3 Suppose there are two media outlets in the market for news. Then:
1. If (18) is satised, then both media outlets will hire moderate editors (i.e., xe1 = xe2 =
1
2
).
2. If (19) is satised then 9CDev < Cmax such that:
(a) If C > CDev;then both media outlets will hire moderate editors (i.e., xe1 = xe2 =
1
2
)
(b) If C < CDev; then the two media outlets will hire non-moderate editors having
symmetric idiosyncratic preferences, i.e., xe1 = 1 xe2 where xe1 ; xe2 2

xmineL ;
1
2
[ 
1
2
; xmaxeR

: Moreover, the lower is C the higher is jxe1   xe2j.
When (18) holds, despite the fact that by choosing, for example, a rightist editor a media
outlet would increase the number of rightist citizens willing to watch its news (i.e., higher
25Each citizen is implicitly assumed to watch at most one media outlet (which is, for example, the case
when two television news programs broadcast at the same time or when there is an upper bound on the
opportunity cost of watching news, e.g., time constraint). Nevertheless, as discussed in section 6.4, this
assumption is without loss of generality. If citizens were to acquire information from multiple sources, the
incentives of media outlets to hire non-moderate editors would only be reinforced.
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marginal rightist viewer), the net e¤ect on the demand of choosing this editor rather than a
moderate one would be always negative. Since choosing a less moderate editor also implies
choosing an editor who will sample relatively less with respect to a more moderate one, the
negative e¤ect on moderate citizensviewership would be higher than the positive e¤ect on
rightist citizensviewership.
Moreover, even when (19) holds, if the opportunity cost of acquiring information is high,
the two media outlets will both choose moderate editors. This is the only case where a
media outlet may not nd it convenient to choose a non-moderate editor in a duopoly while
it would in a monopoly. The reason behind this di¤erence is that in the monopoly case
choosing, for example, a rightist editor instead of a moderate one will decrease the demand
for news by leftist citizens. However, moderate citizens will still be willing to watch such
media outlet rather than not acquire any information at all. Instead, in the duopoly case,
when the opportunity cost of acquiring information is high, by choosing a rightist editor, a
media outlet may face a reduction in the demand for its news by moderate citizens larger
than the increase in the demand by rightist citizens.
On the other hand, when the opportunity cost is low, the demand for news by extremist
citizens will be bigger. Hence, the two media outlets will choose specular types of non-
moderate editors. That is, while in the monopolistic case there was only a rightist (or
leftist) editor, in presence of two media outlets there will be also a leftist (or rightist) editor.
Moreover, the lower is the opportunity cost, the higher will be the di¤erence between the
idiosyncratic preferences of the editors hired by the two media outlets. Finally, given the
results of lemma 1, even in this case optimal editors could never be too extremist.
5.3 Multiple Media Outlets
This section analyzes the case where there are multiple media outlets in the market for
news, i.e., K > 2: The above analysis has shown that when moderate citizens are uniformly
distributed in the policy space, or when the mass of moderate citizens is higher than the one
of non-moderate citizens, media outlets will hire moderate editors both in a monopoly and
in a duopoly. The following proposition shows that when there are multiple media outlets in
the market for news, this is not always the case. More specically, when xi  U [0; 1], as the
number of media outlets present in the market increases, the equilibrium where every media
outlet chooses a moderate editor is not sustainable anymore. Indeed, any media outlet would
have an incentive to di¤erentiate its news productby choosing a non-moderate editor.
Proposition 4 Suppose that citizens idiosyncratic preferences are distributed uniformly
in [0; 1]:Then, 9K 2 (2;1) such that for K > K the set xej = 12 ;8j = 1; :::; K	 is
not anymore an equilibrium. In such case, it still exists a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, K is increasing in C:
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The above proposition shows that when the market for moderate newsgets crowded,
media outlets will prefer to choose a di¤erent location for their news product. That is, the
higher the degree of competition in the market for news, the more likely it is that media
outlets will hire non-moderate editors. Even though more competition brings more slant in
news reports, it still has a positive e¤ect on citizenswelfare since it allows a higher portion
of population to get informed. Hence, more competition brings more viewpoint diversity
which has indeed a positive e¤ect on citizenswelfare. Nevertheless, it is important to point
out that, in a more general framework, the e¤ects of competition on citizenswelfare could
be more subtle. Specically, in a repeated game, the short run polarization of beliefs is
going to reinforce the demand for news coming from like-minded sources (see Gentzkow and
Shapiro 2006). Hence, this may result in a long run polarization of beliefs and, thus, of
choices by di¤erent citizens.26
Moreover, since the higher the opportunity cost of acquiring information, the less extrem-
ists citizens will nd it optimal to acquire information, as such cost increases the likelihood
of media outlets choosing non-moderate editors decreases.27 That is, it is possible to reinter-
pret the above proposition with respect to C. For a given K > 2; there will exist a C(K)
such that for C > C(K); all media outlets will hire a moderate editor from the population
of citizens. Instead, for C < C(K); media outlets will hire non-moderate editors. This
result, along with the ones of propositions 2 and 3, suggests that more moderate editors
should be expected to prevail in a news market where the opportunity cost is high. A clear
application of this result is represented by the di¤erences between the broadcast media sec-
tor with respect to the press. The opportunity cost of watching a report from a broadcast
media is arguably lower than the one of reading a newspaper. The analysis thus suggests
that more moderate editors should be present in the press sector than in the broadcast me-
dia sector. At the same time, there should be more extremist citizens watching broadcast
media and a higher overall demand for broadcast media with respect to the one faced by
the press.
6 Discussion
6.1 Scope of the model
While the main application of the paper focuses on the citizenschoice between alternative
candidates, the framework easily extends to a broader set of applications beyond the political
environment. Specically, the model provides a general economic rationale for endogenous
26See also Suen (2004) for a model with heterogeneous priors and coarse information leading to a short-
runpolarization of beliefs. On the other hand, when media bias originates from the supply-side, a higher
degree of competition typically decreases media bias and increases citizenswelfare (Besley and Prat 2006,
Ellman and Germano 2009, Anderson and McLaren 2010, Germano and Meier 2010).
27Indeed lim
C!Cmax
K !1:
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preferences for like-minded sources of information. Suppose, for example, that a consumer
is interested in buying a car and she is undecided between a European and an American car.
Her decision is likely to depend both on her idiosyncratic taste (e.g., esthetic idiosyncratic
valuation of the car) and on the quality of these two types of cars (i.e., the valence of
the car). What is the best source of information for a consumer facing this choice? (i.e.,
which kind of car magazine would she nd optimal to read?). The model suggests that
a consumer whose idiosyncratic preferences are more in favor of the American car would
like to read a car magazine whose editor share similar idiosyncratic preferences in favor of
American cars. A similar intuition applies to a situation where an individual has to decide
whether to invest in a risky or in a safe asset. The model predicts that individuals who are
very risk adverse should acquire information from a media outlet with a very risk adverse
editor and viceversa. In turn, this implies that di¤erent media outlets will nd optimal
to hire editors with di¤erent idiosyncratic preferences (i.e., di¤erent optimal information
acquisition strategies) who will cater to di¤erent audiences.
6.2 Private Value of Information and Utility
As usual in the literature on the demand for news (e.g., Strömberg 2004, Mullainathan and
Shleifer 2005, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, Chan and Suen 2008, Anderson and McLaren
2010) I have assumed that citizens receive utility from choosing a given candidate/alternative
per se.28 Since news has a public-good nature and the probability of being pivotal is close
to zero, the expected benet of acquiring information is likely to be negligible. That is,
acquiring information is a typical free-riding problem. Hence, in my model, as in the rest of
this literature, it is necessary to explain why citizens bother spending the opportunity cost
of watching TV news or reading newspapers.
A straightforward rationale for the demand for news is the one proposed by Strömberg
(2004) and Anderson and McLaren (2010). That is, citizens may be using news reports
to decide on a private action whose value depends on the public policy implemented (or
candidate elected). For example, the news could cover the quality and virtues of the public
school system and the private decision is the choice between enrolling in a public or in a
private school. That is, the willingness to acquire information on the state of the world
in order to make a more informed private decision generates a market demand for news,
and through the voting system a¤ects the direction of the public decision(Anderson and
McLaren 2010, page 9).
On the other hand, regardless of the possible abstention game among citizens, the subset of
individuals who decide to turn out would still choose either to not acquire any information
at all or to acquire information from the source which is most valuable from their own
28Similarly, the model shares with this literature the implicit assumption that a citizen must watch the
news report in order to learn its information content.
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individual perspective. That is, liberal (conservative) citizens will still either not watch any
news at all or watch a media outlet with a liberal (conservative) editor. Hence, the presence
of free-riding on information would increase the incentives to not acquire any information,
but not the incentives regarding the type of information to acquire. Thus, the overall demand
for information would be a¤ected in its size but not in its composition (i.e., liberal citizens
would still watch a liberal media outlet or no media outlet at all).
6.3 Media OutletsProts and Information Acquisition
Since the main focus of the paper is on the demand for slanted news, the model provides a
stylized representation of media outletsprots. Considering a more general compensation
mechanism for the editor would a¤ect both the revenues and the costs of a media outlet.
Once on the job, editors (and journalists) are the ones who will spend time and exert e¤ort
to collect evidence on any given issue. That is, media outlets do not directly bear this day
to day cost of information acquisition. Nevertheless, in order to increase its prots, a media
outlet may try to induce its editor to change her optimal information acquisition strategy
by designing an incentive mechanism. As shown by lemma 1, ideally all citizens would
like to watch a media outlet whose editor keeps acquiring information until she learns the
true state of the world (i.e., ne =  1; ne = 1): However, it is not feasible for the media
outlet to induce the editor to adopt such a sampling strategy. This is true for two simple
reasons: i) information acquisition is costly for the editor and hence it is also costly for
the media outlet to compensate the editor for acquiring extra pieces of information; ii) the
media outlet cannot monitor the information gathered by the editor (i.e., the media outlet
cannot observe the draws sampled by the editor). Nevertheless, a media outlet may induce
an editor to choose stopping rules which are higher (in absolute value) with respect to the
ones she would choose in the absence of any incentive mechanism. In this perspective, a
simple incentive mechanism that the media outlet could implement is to o¤er to the editor
a share  of the media outlets prots. This would induce the editor to choose higher (in
absolute value) stopping rules. Indeed, in the absence of perfect monitoring, any incentive
scheme inducing the editor to sample more would produce the same results of a decrease in
the marginal cost of sampling c (i.e., any signal acquired is more valuable or, equivalently,
less costly). That is, as shown by proposition 1, a lower c induces an editor to acquire more
information.29 Nevertheless, such incentive mechanisms would not change the main results
since the stopping rules of non-moderate editors would still be asymmetric. That is, the
private value component in the editors preferences would still induce a non-moderate editor
to adopt a slantedinformation acquisition strategy.30
29Notice that a media outlet may also decrease c by giving the editor more resources to produce the news
reports (e.g., more correspondents, better technology, more resources to investigate an issue, etc.).
30Moreover, the cost of acquiring information by editors may be also reinterpreted as a discount factor
(see Brocas and Carrillo 2009). In such case, each editor has to decide when to stop gathering information.
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Moreover, it would be extremely costly for a media outlet to induce a moderate editor
to gather an amount of information such that even extremists citizens would consider this
media outlet a valuable source of information.31 In addition, as discussed in section 4, while
all citizens with preferences x^ejxe= 12 < xi < ~xejxe= 12 nd the information coming from a
moderate editor valuable, some of them would nd the information coming from an editor
with similar idiosyncratic preferences even more valuable. Hence, there will always be a
demand for slantednews by non-moderate citizens that a media outlet may capture by
hiring a non-moderate editor.32
6.4 Multiple Sources of Information
Throughout the analysis, it was assumed that citizens watch at most one media outlet.
Nevertheless, while such assumption greatly simplies the analysis, the intuition and the
results of the model do not rely on it.
Indeed, if citizens were to acquire information from multiple sources, the incentives of me-
dia outlets to hire non-moderate editors would only be reinforced. For any citizen, watching
two media outlets with a moderate editor has the same value of watching only one. Specif-
ically, after having observed the news report of a moderate editor, watching an additional
media outlet with another moderate editor would either not change the citizens ranking of
preferences, or it would lead citizens posterior beliefs to be equal to the prior (i.e., the two
reports would just canceleach other). Hence, if citizens could access multiple sources of
information, the incentives of media outlets to di¤erentiate their products by hiring non-
moderate editors would, indeed, be higher.
6.5 Editors Inuence on Citizens
In the model the utility of the editor depends on her own choice. Nevertheless, even if the
editors utility were to depend on the citizens choice, the information acquisition strategy
of the editor would not change. Indeed, the only credible strategy by an editor with idio-
syncratic preferences xe is to report ne upon reaching n

e and to report n

e upon reaching n

e:
Since citizens know the idiosyncratic preferences of the editor, even if she were to try to in-
uence citizenschoice by over-reporting the number of signals in favor of a given candidate,
citizens would still be able to perfectly discount her bias and infer the actual stopping
threshold (i.e., any n > ne would be interpreted as n

e and any n < n

e as n

e).
Hence, by inducing an editor to sample more, a media outlet would also delay the release of the news report
which may have a negative e¤ect on the demand for it and, hence, on the prots.
31Indeed; x^e ! 0 and ~xe ! 1 if and only if ne !  1; ne !1,  ! 1=2 and C ! 0:
32Moreover, it would be cheaper for a media outlet to capture such demand for slantednews of non-
moderate citizens by hiring an editor with similar idiosyncratic preferences, rather than hiring a moderate
one and provide her with incentives to acquire a large amount of information in both directions.
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Notice that the model could indeed be seen as a special case of a commitment-free mech-
anism of Bayesian persuasion, as dened by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2010), where the
Sender (the editor) can inuence the choice of a rational Bayesian Receiver (the citizens)
by inuencing her beliefs. Specically, in my setting the fact that the Senders preferences
depend on the state of the world and acquiring signals is costly, mitigates the incentive com-
patibility constraints. That is, there is an endogenous commitment mechanism arising from
the editors idiosyncratic preferences and the cost of drawing a signal. The Receiver knows
that the only credible signal realization is the one implicitly dened by the two stopping
thresholds of the Sender (i.e., the editor can only credibly commit to such signal acquisition
strategy).33 Hence, since there is an alignment of preferences between the Sender and the
Receiver (i.e., all citizens willing to acquire information from a given editor will have the
same ex-post ranking of preferences as the one of the editor), the Sender will truthfully
reveal the signal realization.
Obviously, in the presence of uncertainty on the editors idiosyncratic preferences there
would also be uncertainty on the editors optimal stopping thresholds. That is, if citizens
only knew that xe  g(x) with supp(x) =

xAe ; x
B
e

and xAe < x
B
e ; then they would also know
that ne  g(ne(xe)) with supp [g(ne(xe))] =

nBe ; n
A
e

where nBe = n

e(x
B
e ) < n
A
e = n

e(x
A
e );
since there is a one-to-one mapping between preferences and optimal stopping thresholds.
Similarly, ne(xe)  g(ne(xe)) with supp [g(ne(xe))] =

nBe ; n
A
e

where nBe = n

e(x
B
e ) < n
A
e =
ne(x
A
e ). In presence of such additional source of uncertainty, the editor will have an incentive
to over-report signals in favor of the preferred candidate once she has reached one of the
two stopping thresholds. That is, such uncertainty would introduce in the model a supply-
drivenbias in news reports. Nevertheless, if the editor had to report nAe ; citizensposterior
beliefs would be (nAe ) = (E(n

e(xe)jnAe )).34 That is, citizens will still be able to infer the
interval in which the optimal editors stopping threshold lies and discount their posterior
beliefs accordingly. Hence, the main mechanism and intuition of the model would not
change. Obviously, the more ideologically distant from the endorsed candidate the editor
is believed to be, the more inuential her reports will be. In other words, the editors
endorsement will be stronger: i) the more moderate the editor is believed to be, upon
endorsing the ideologically closer candidate; ii) the less moderate the editor is believed to
be, upon endorsing the ideologically least preferred candidate. Hence, in most of the cases
(i.e., when endorsing the ideologically closer candidate), an editor would like to be believed
to be as unbiased(i.e., moderate) as possible.35
33Any other mechanism would, simply, not be credible. The stopping thresholds represent the net di¤er-
ence in the number of signals in favor of one candidate. Hence, once the editor has reached one of the two
thresholds, she has always an incentive to hide signals against the endorsed candidate.
34Similarly, upon reporting nBe ; citizensposterior beliefs would be (n
B
e ) = (E(n

e(xe)jnBe )):
35Indeed, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, the empirical analysis of Chiang and
Knight (2010) shows that the degree of inuence of a newspaper on voters depends on the credibilityof
the endorsement.
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7 Conclusions
The paper has analyzed a market for news in which prot maximizing media outlets hire
their editors from the population of citizens. The results have shown that when information
acquisition by editors is costly, citizens may nd optimal to acquire information from a
like-minded source of information (i.e., from a media outlet having an editor with similar
idiosyncratic preferences). Consequently, a prot maximizing media outlet may prefer to
hire a non-moderate editor in order to capture the demand for news of non-moderate citizens.
Hence, even though citizens do not derive any exogenous utility from biased information,
they all share the same prior beliefs and media outlets are just maximizing prots, the
endogenous acquisition of costly information may induce a media outlet to choose an editor
whose optimal information acquisition strategy is slanted in favor of the alternative ex-
ante preferred by a subset of citizens. Therefore, my model provides a rationale for the
presence of media slant purely based on the citizensdemand for the most valuable source of
information. At the same time, the results also show that there is always an upper bound on
the possible extremismof an editor above which the demand for news by rational citizens
is strictly decreasing.
In a market for news where the opportunity cost of acquiring information for citizens is
low, there will be a higher demand by non-moderate citizens. Thus, non-moderate editors
are more likely to be hired by media outlets in such market with respect to a market where
the opportunity cost of acquiring information is high. A straightforward application of this
result lies in the di¤erences between the broadcast media and the press. The model predicts
that more moderate editors should be present in the press sector than in the broadcast media
sector. Moreover, broadcast media outlets should face a higher demand from extremist
citizens (and a higher demand overall) with respect to the one faced by the press.
The results also show that the higher the degree of competition in the market for news, the
more likely that media outlets will hire non-moderate editors. That is, when the market for
news gets crowded, a media outlet may prefer to di¤erentiate its news product by choosing
a di¤erent location in the policy space (i.e., hire an editor with di¤erent idiosyncratic char-
acteristics), rather than sharing the demand for news of moderate citizens with the other
media outlets. Moreover, even though more competition brings more slant in news reports,
it still has a positive e¤ect on citizenswelfare since it allows a higher portion of population
to get informed.
Nevertheless, I should also point out that in a more general framework the e¤ects of
competition on citizenswelfare may not be so straightforward. In a repeated game, the
short run polarization of beliefs would reinforce the demand for news coming from like-
minded sources which, in turn, may lead to a long run polarization of beliefs and, thus, of
choices by di¤erent citizens. More generally, this paper has focused only on the demand
for slanted news. In order to carefully assess the e¤ects of competition on citizenswelfare,
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policy regulators should take into account the possible presence of both demand-driven and
supply-driven sources of media bias in the market for news.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The problem involves analyzing a stochastic process with two absorbing states. More specically,
the equations characterizing these two absorbing states (i.e., ne and ne) must be determined: After
m draws, given that a current di¤erence in signals in favor of r equal to n; the value function of
editor e is given by (9). This is a standard problem of sequential testing of two simple hypotheses
(see Chapter 4 in Shiryaev, 2007). Hence, it can be proven that ne and ne are dened implicitly
by the following two rst order conditions:36
@Ve
@ne
jne =
(ln)n

e
n

e   ne
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(2x  1)

n

e + 1

 

n

e   1

(2  H(ne   ne))
i
 H

1  ne

= 0
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@ne
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(ln)n
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e
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e   ne
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n

e + 1

+

1  ne

(2  H (ne   ne))
i
+H

n

e   1

= 0
where H = c2 1 and  =
1 
 < 1. Where it must be always the case that n

e < 0 and n

e > 0.
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It is also immediate to verify that for xe = 12 it must be the case that n

e = jnej : Notice that the
optimal stopping rule ne and ne do not depend on n: That is the optimal stopping rule do not
change depending on the realization of the signals.38 Lets consider the two rst order conditions
and lets denote them as f and g. That is:
f =
@Ve
@ne
jne = 0 (20)
g =
@Ve
@ne
jn=ne = 0 (21)
that is ne and ne are the solution of the following system of equations:
f(ne(xe; ; c); ne(xe; ; c); xe; ; c) = 0
g(ne(xe; ; c); ne(xe; ; c); xe; ; c) = 0
In order to obtain the comparative statics, it is necessary to derive the di¤erential of these func-
tions.39 That is: (
@f
@ne
dne +
@f
@ne
dne +
@f
@xe
dxe +
@f
@ d +
@f
@c dc = 0
@g
@ne
dne +
@g
@ne
dne +
@g
@xe
dxe +
@g
@d +
@g
@cdc = 0
Lets focus on the comparative statics with respect to xe: That is,
dne
dxe
and dn

e
dxe
must be determined,
36The online appendix contains an extended proof where these rst order conditions are formally derived.
37Suppose not. That is ne > 0: Thus  (n

e) >  (n = 0) = p: If xe >
1
2 ; this would imply that  (n

e) > ^e
and thus e;m(ne) = R which contradicts the denition of n

e: If xe <
1
2 ; then since n = 0 < n

e; this implies
that e(n = 0) = L and thus the voter would never start sampling. A similar proof applies to show that
ne > 0:
38A detailed formal derivation of the second order conditions, ensuring that (ne; n

e) is a global maximum,
is available upon request to the author.
39These comparative statics are determined by treating n as a real number. This mathematical abuse
is made for technical convenience (for an analogous treatment see Brocas and Carrillo 2009 and Brocas,
Carrillo and Palfrey 2011). At the same time, a marginal change in ne and/or n

e has a straightforward
interpretation. For example, a marginal increase in the threshold required by a citizen-editor to endorse
candidate j simply represents a marginal increase in the probability of such a citizen-editor requiring one
more signal in favor of j to endorse her.
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holding the other parameter constants. Hence, d = 0 and dc = 0: Thus:
dne
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Then, simple calculations yields:
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and
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
H (ne + 1) (n
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Moreover,
dnedxe 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 if and only if:
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
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thus since
(1  nene )
8<:
> 0 for xe < 1=2
= 0 for xe = 1=2
< 0 for xe > 1=2
(24)
the result follows. Lets now focus on the comparative statics with respect to : Using the same
methodology as the one described above:
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Moreover,
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hence given (24) the results follow. Finally, the comparative statics with respect to c are:
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Proof of Corollary 1
Since
Pr(e = Ljs = r) = 2(n

e)  1
(ne)  (ne)
(ne)
and
Pr(e = Rjs = l) = 1  2(n

e)
(ne)  (ne)
[1  (ne)]
Thus it is easy to verify that Pr(e = Ljs = r) is decreasing in xe and Pr(e = Rjs = l) is increasing
in xe: Moreover, the ex-ante probability of making a wrong choice is:
Pr(error) = Pr(s = r) Pr(e = Ljs = r) + Pr(s = l) Pr(e = Rjs = l)
hence:
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It is now possible to perform the comparative statics upon this probability. First of all:
@ Pr(error)
@ne
=
1
2
(ln)n

e
 
n

e   12
(n

e   ne )2 < 0
@ Pr(error)
@ne
=  1
2
(ln)n

e
 
1  ne2
(n

e   ne )2 > 0
Hence, since dn

e
dc < 0 and
dne
dc > 0; then
dPr(error)
dc > 0. Similarly, since
dne
d > 0 and
dne
d < 0; then
dPr(error)
d < 0.
Finally given (22) and (23) derived in the proof of Proposition 1, dPr(error)dxe > 0 if and only if: 
2n

e   2ne  1 + nene  1  nene
(n

e + 1) (ne + 1)
< 0
Thus, given (24):
dPr(error)
dxe
8<:
< 0 for x < 12
= 0 for x = 12
> 0 for x > 12
Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 1
It is immediate to verify that (~xe   x^e) is decreasing in C: Lets now focus on ~xe: Then:
d~xe(n

e; n

e)
dne
=  C (ln) 
ne
 
n

e   1
(n

e + 1) (1  ne )2 > 0
d~xe(n

e; n

e)
dne
= (ln)
n

e
(n

e + 1)2
 
2   C
 
n

e + 1

(1  ne )
!
< 0
The it is immediate to verify that ~xe is increasing in : Lets now analyze how ~xe changes as xe
increases. First, I want to prove that for any xe < 1=2 it is always the case that d~xe=dxe > 0. From
the proof of proposition 1 we know that for xe < 1=2,
dnedxe  > dnedxe  : Hence, a su¢ cient condition
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to ensure that d~xe=dxe > 0 is simply:d~xe(ne; ne)dne
 > d~xe(ne; ne)dne

which is true if and only if:
C
 
n

e
 
2n

e   1
n

e (1  ne )2 +
 
n

e + 1

(1  ne )
!
< 2
Since @@ne

1 ne
1+n

e

> 0 and dn

e
dxe
< 0, then 

1 ne
1+n

e

 Cmax: Hence, a su¢ cient condition for the
above condition to be always true is:
(n

en

e   1)

n

e + n

e

< 0
which it is always the case for xe < 1=2: Moreover, for xe = 1=2; ne =  ne and thus:
d~xe
dxe

xe=1=2
=   4
H
(ln)
2n

e
 
(1  ne )  C(ne + 1)
(1  2ne ) ((1  3ne ) + ne (1  ne )) > 0
Hence, for any xe  1=2; it is always the case that d~xe=dxe > 0: Lets analyze now the case where
xe > 1=2. Then, d~xe=dxe > 0 if and only if:
C < ~C  2 
2ne
 
1  2ne2
2ne (2n

e   1) (ne + 1)2 + 2ne (ne + 1)2 (1  2ne ) (25)
hence ~C > 0: Lets now analyze how ~C changes when xe increases:
@ ~C
@ne
=   4 (ln)
 
1  2ne2ne+ne
2ne (n

e + 1)2 (2n

e   1) + 2ne (ne + 1)2 (1  2ne )Y > 0
where
Y =
0@2ne +  1  2ne
h
2n

e
 
1  23ne   32ne+ ne  ne + 12  2ne   1i
2ne (n

e + 1)2 (2n

e   1) + 2ne (ne + 1)2 (1  2ne )

1A > 0
since
 
1  23ne   32ne > 0: Moreover:
@ ~C
@ne
=  4 (ln)
2ne
 
n

e   12  ne + 12  ne + 4ne + 3ne + 1  2ne
2ne (n

e + 1)2 (2n

e   1) + 2ne (ne + 1)2 (1  2ne )
2 > 0
hence since dn

e
dxe
< 0 and dn

e
dxe
< 0 :
d ~C
dxe
=
@ ~C
@ne
dne
dxe
+
@ ~C
@ne
dne
dxe
< 0
Hence, ~xe will be increasing in xe for xe > 1=2 if and only if C < ~C: That is, since d
~C
dxe
< 0; ~xe will
be increasing in xe only as long as xe < xmaxeR ; where:
~C
 
ne(x
max
eR
); ne(x
max
eR
)

= C
32
Moreover, since d
~C
dxe
< 0; ~Cmax < lim
xe!1=2
~C = Cmax: Finally, since  2  0; 12, xmaxeR < 1: Specically,
for  < 1=2 an editor with preferences xeR = 1 would never endorse a leftist candidate since,
trivially, ^(xeR=1)
= 0 (i.e., ne(xeR = 1) = 0) which implies that ~C(xeR = 1) = 0: For  = 1=2; an
editor with preferences xeR = 1 will endorse a leftist candidate if and only if (n) = 0: That is, if
and only if n =  1. Hence, necessary conditions for this to be veried are ne(xeR = 1) !  1
and ne(xeR = 1)! 0: As shown by proposition 1, for xe > 12 it is the case that
dnedxe  > dnedxe  : That
is, when xeR ! 1 it must be the case that neR ! 0 but neR  
neR 9  1: In turn, this implies
that ~C ! 0 when xeR ! 1.
Lets now focus on x^e: Then:
dx^e
dne
= (ln)
n

e
 
2(n

e   1)  C(ne + 1)
(n

e   1) (ne + 1)2 < 0
dx^e
dne
=  C (ln)ne 1  
ne
(ne + 1) (n

e   1)2 > 0
Thus it is immediate to verify that x^e is decreasing in : Lets now analyze how x^e changes as xe
increases. First, I want to prove that for any xe > 1=2 it is always the case that dx^e=dxe > 0. As
shown in the proof of proposition 1, for xe > 1=2, then
dnedxe  < dnedxe  : Hence, a su¢ cient condition
to ensure that dx^e=dxe > 0 is simply:dx^e(ne; ne)dne
 < dx^e(ne; ne)dne

that is
C
 
n

e
 
1  2ne
ne (n

e   1)2 +
(n

e + 1)
(n

e   1)
!
< 2
moreover since Cmax  1 n

e
(ne+1)
 <  
ne 1
(ne+1)
, a su¢ cient condition for the above to be veried
becomes:
(1  nene )  ne + ne
ne (2n

e   1) < 0
hence since (1  nene ) < 0 for xe > 1=2; we have proved that for xe > 1=2 it is always the case
that dx^e=dxe > 0: Moreover, for xe = 1=2; ne =  ne and thus:
dx^e
dxe

xe=1=2
=   4
H
(ln)
2n

e
 
(1  ne )  C(ne + 1)
(1  2ne ) ((1  3ne ) + ne (1  ne )) > 0
Hence, for any xe  1=2; it is always the case that dx^e=dxe > 0: Lets now analyze the case where
xe < 1=2: In this case, dx^e=dxe > 0 if and only if:
C < C^  2 
2ne
 
2n

e   12
2n

e (1  2ne ) (ne + 1)2 + 2ne (2ne   1) (ne + 1)2 (26)
hence C^ > 0: Lets now analyze how C^ changes when xe increases. First of all:
@C^
@ne
= 4 (ln)2n

e
 
2n

e   12  ne + 4ne + 3ne + 1  2ne
2ne (n

e + 1)2 (2n

e   1) + 2ne (ne + 1)2 (1  2ne )
2 < 0
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and
@C^
@ne
=
4 (ln)
 
2n

e   1ne+2ne
2ne (n

e + 1)2 (2n

e   1) + 2ne (ne + 1)2 (1  2ne )
2W < 0
where
W = 2n

en

e

(2n

e   2ne ) +

1 + 2n

en

e

1  ne

+

n

e   2ne

2n

e + n

e2n

e + 3n

e2n

e + 1

hence since dn

e
dxe
< 0 and dn

e
dxe
< 0 :
dC^
dxe
=
@C^
@ne
dne
dxe
+
@C^
@ne
dne
dxe
> 0
Hence, x^e will be increasing in xe for xe < 1=2 if and only if C < C^: That is, since dC^dxe > 0; ~xe will
be increasing in xe only as long as xe > xmineL ; where x
min
eL
is such that:
C^
 
ne(x
min
eL
); ne(x
min
eL
)

= C
Moreover, since dC^dxe > 0; C^
max < lim
xe!1=2
C^ = Cmax: Finally, by using an analogous proof to the one
employed above to show that xmaxeR < 1; it is immediate to see that since  2
 
0; 12

, it is always
the case that xmineL > 0 and that C^ ! 0 when xeL ! 0: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal strategy for a prot maximizing monopolist media outlet is to choose an editor with
idiosyncratic preference xe such that its prots are maximized. That is xmone must be such that:
d
dxe
=
d
dne
dne
dxe
+
d
dne
dne
dxe
= 0
Where:
d
dne
=
dF (~xe)
dne
  dF (x^e)
dne
d
dne
=
dF (~xe)
dne
  dF (x^e)
dne
where dF (~xe)dne =
d
dne
Z ~xe(ne)

f(x)dx: Hence applying Leibnizs rule:
dF (~xe)
dne
=
d
dne
Z ~xe(ne ;ne)

f(x)dx = f(~xe(n

e; n

e))
d~xe(n

e; n

e)
dne
thus,
d
dne
= f(~xe(n

e; n

e))
d~xe(n

e; n

e)
dne
  f(x^e(ne; ne))
dx^e(n

e)
dne
similarly
d
dne
= f(~xe(n

e; n

e))
d~xe(n

e; n

e)
dne
  f(x^e(ne; ne))
dx^e(n

e; n

e)
dne
Hence the rst order condition becomes:
d~xe=dxe
dx^e=dxe
=
f(x^e(n

e; n

e))
f(~xe(ne; ne))
(27)
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where:
d~xe
dxe
=
 2 (ln)
H(n

e   ne )
 
2
2n

e
 
n

e + 1

(n

e + 1)3
  C
 
2n

e
 
n

e   1
(ne + 1) (1  ne )2 +
2n

e
 
n

e + 1
2
(1  ne ) (ne + 1)3
!!
dx^e
dxe
=
 2 (ln)
H(n

e   ne )
 
2
2n

e
 
n

e + 1

(ne + 1)3
  C
 
2n

e
 
1  ne
(n

e + 1) (n

e   1)2 +
2n

e
 
n

e + 1
2
(n

e   1) (ne + 1)3
!!
From the proof of lemma 1, we know that for xe = 1=2, d~xe=dxe = dx^e=dxe > 0: Hence, for
xe = 1=2;
d~xe=dxe
dx^e=dxe
= 1: More generally, for any xe :
d~xe
dxe
  dx^e
dxe
= (1  nene )(ne   ne )    
where
 = 2
 
4n

en

e +
 
n

e + n

e

(1 + n

en

e )

(n

e + 1)3 (ne + 1)3
and
 = 4C

2n

e
(ne+1)
2
(1 2ne )
+ 
2ne
(ne+1)
2
(2ne 1)

(n

e   1) (1  ne )
where  and  are always positive. Hence given (24):
d~xe=dxe
dx^e=dxe
8<:
> 1 for xe < 12
= 1 for xe = 12
< 1 for xe > 12
(28)
In other words, for xe > 12 an increase in xe increases x^e more than ~xe (and viceversa for xe <
1
2):
Then, it is immediate to verify that when the distribution of citizensidiosyncratic preferences is
such that (18) is veried, then xe = 12 is the unique stationary point and the global maximum.
Now suppose F (x) is such that (19) is veried. For xeR >
1
2 to be a stationary point it must be
the case that f(x^eR(n

e; n

e)) < f(~xeR(n

e; n

e)): Moreover, from lemma 1 and (28) we know that for
xeR > 1=2; then ~xeR(n

e; n

e) > 1   x^eR(ne; ne): Then, xe = 12 cannot be a global maximum since
df(x)
dx

x=1=2
> 0 and d~xedxe

x=1=2
= dx^edxe

x=1=2
. Thus the stationary point xmoneR >
1
2 such that (27)
is satised will be a global maximum on
 
1
2 ; 1

. Then by the symmetry of f; choosing an editor
with symmetric preferences will also be prot-maximizing. That is, we have two global maxima
in this case xmoneR and x
mon
eL
= 1   xmoneR . Indeed, since the distribution function f is symmetric
around 12 ; so it must be the demand function. To sum up, if F (x) is such that (18) holds the global
maximum is always at xe = 12 . Instead, if F (x) is such that (19) holds, there are two symmetric
global maxima such that xeR = 1 xeL > 1=2: The last part of the proposition follows immediately
from lemma 1 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Lets start with the case where (18) holds. We show that in this case the unique equilibrium is
such that x1e = x
2
e =
1
2 : Suppose that media outlet 1 deviates by choosing x
1
e > x
2
e =
1
2 : If media
outlet one deviates, the indi¤erent viewer, i.e., the viewer who will be indi¤erent between watching
media outlet 1 and media outlet 2 is the one having preferences xI such that UI(W1) = UI(W2):
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That is:
xI(n

e1 ; n

e1 ; n

e2) =
1
2
+

n

e1n

e1   1

0@(1  ne2 )

n

e1   ne1


n

e2 + 1
   ne1   11  ne1
1A
where since x2e =
1
2 ; then n

e2 =  ne2 : The no-deviation condition for media outlet 1 requires that
@xe > 12 such that the demand if deviating is higher than the demand if not deviating. Specically,
the demand that media outlet 1 faces when not deviating is:
DNDev(x1e) = D
NDev
 
x2e

=
1
2
h
F ( ~xejxe= 12 )  F ( x^jxe= 12 )
i
=

F ( ~xejxe= 12 )  F

1
2

(29)
Instead the demand that media outlet 1 faces if it deviates is:
DDev(x1e) =
h
F ( ~xejx1e)  F (max fx^e1 ;xI(xe1)g)
i
(30)
Notice that for any non-uniform distribution satisfying (18) the mass of citizens is strictly decreas-
ing moving away from the mean of the distribution at 1/2. Hence it is enough to show that this
no-deviation condition holds even in the case where citizenspreferences are uniformly distributed
in [0; 1]:40 In the case of a uniform distribution, the following represents a su¢ cient no-deviation
condition:
xI(n

e1 ; n

e1 ; n

e2) 
1
2
> ~xejx1e   ~xejxe= 12
hence media outlet 1 would not deviate if and only if:
C > CTHR = 

2n

e1   1

1  ne1


n

e1n

e1   1
2
0@

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1
   (1  ne2 )
n

e2 + 1
 ne1 + 1
1A
where CTHR > 0 if and only if 
n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1
 > (1  ne2 )
n

e2 + 1

Let A =


ne1 
ne1



ne1+1


ne1 +1
 : For xe > 12 ; dAdxe < 0 which implies that:

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1
 <

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1


xe=
1
2
=
(1  ne2 )
n

e2 + 1
 (31)
hence CTHR < 0: Therefore, in a duopoly when the distribution of citizensidiosyncratic preferences
is such that (18) holds (and where citizens watch at most one media report), there will never be
an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium at x1e = 1  x2e = 12 : Moreover, notice that this is the
unique Nash equilibrium. If the two media outlets were to choose non-moderate editors, then each
of them would clearly have an incentive to deviate by choosing a moderate one.
Lets now analyze the case where (19) holds. First of all, in order to ensure that there is someone
40Notice also that, as stated in section 2.2 the analysis focuses on symmetric distributions.
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willing to watch media 1 the following condition must be satised
xI(n

e1 ; n

e1 ; n

e2) < ~xe(x
1
e)
that is:
C < C = 2

1  ne1


n

e2 + 1
 (32)
where clearly C > 0:41 Lets now analyze the no-deviation condition for C < C. Consider (29)
and (30) and let CDuop = CDuop(xe1) be the highest opportunity cost such that for xe1 2
 
1
2 ; 1

the following condition holds (i.e., CDuop being the opportunity cost associated with the most
protable deviation from xe1 = 1=2):
42
F (max fx^e1 ;xI(xe1)g)  12
F (~xe1)  F ( ~xejxe= 12 )
 0 (33)
now denote CDev = min

C;CDuop
	
; then for C 2  0; CDev media outlet 1 will have an incentive
to deviate by choosing a non-moderate editor.43 Hence, in such case there is no equilibrium
where both media outlets choose a moderate editor.44 Lets now show that it can never exist
an equilibrium with xe1 = xe2 6= 12 : Suppose the two media outlets choose the same type of
non-moderate editors (e.g., xe1 = xe2 >
1
2). By doing so their demand would be
D1(xe1 = xe2) = D
2(xe1 = xe2) =
F (~xe1)  F (x^e1)
2
while if media outlet 2 chooses an editor with preferences xe2 = 1  xe1 its demand would be:
D2(xe2 = 1  xe1) = min

F (~xe2);
1
2

  F (x^e2)
where by symmetry x^e2 = 1   ~xe1 ; which implies that F (x^e2) = 1   F (~xe1) : Thus, a necessary
condition for media outlet 2 not be willing to deviate is 1   F (x^e1) > F (~xe1) : However, since
xe1 >
1
2 ; then ~xe1 > 1   x^e1 and given (19) this condition cannot hold. An analogous proof
applies for xe1 = xe2 <
1
2 : Hence, for C 2
 
0; CDev

the only possible Nash Equilibrium must
be such that xe1 = 1   xe2 6= 1=2: Lets show that this is indeed an equilibrium.45 Suppose that
xe1 = 1   xe2 > 12 ; then there are two possible cases. In the rst one, 8xe1 = 1   xe2 2
 
1
2 ; x
max
eR

it is always the case that:46
dF (max fx^e1 ;xI(xe1)g)
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2
<
dF (~xe1)
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2
(34)
41Notice also that xI(ne1 ; n

e1 ; n

e2) < ~xejxe= 12 if and only if C < C  2

1 n

e1


ne2+1

ne1 n

e2 1

ne1 n

e1 1
where C > 0
since
ne1 > ne2 :
42Since f(x) is assumed to be symmetric with respect to 1=2; the mean and the median will always be at
1=2: Hence F (1=2) = 1=2:
43Clearly, if CDev < 0; rm 1 will never have an incentive to deviate. Indeed, as shown in the previous
case where (18) holds, when F is a uniform c.d.f. CDev = CTHR < 0:
44CDev is always lower than Cmax since for C = Cmax only citizens with xe = 12 watch news reports and
thus rm 1 would never have an incentive to deviate.
45Obviously, for C 2  0; CDev there are always two symmetric Nash Equilibria, i.e., xe1 = 1   xe2 < 12
and xe1 = 1  xe2 > 12 .
46Symmetric conditions apply for media outlet 2:
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where for xe1 = 1   xe2 ; xI(xe1) is always 1=2: Hence in this case xe1 = 1   xe2 = xmaxeR is a
Nash equilibrium. Indeed, by lemma 1, ~xe1 is increasing in xe1 if and only if xe1 < x
max
eR
: Hence,
dF (~xe1 )
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2
> 0 if and only if xe1 < x
max
eR
: On the other hand, since by lemma 1, for xe1 > 1=2,
x^e1 is always increasing in xe1 and xI is increasing in xe1 when xe1 = 1   xe2 (i.e., for xI = 1=2):
Thus given (19) it is always the case that
dF(maxfx^e1 ;xI(xe1 )g)
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2
> 0. Thus, none of the two
media outlet would have an incentive to deviate from xe1 = 1   xe2 = xmaxeR by choosing a more
leftist or more rightist editor. In the second case, 9xe1 2
 
1
2 ; x
max
eR

such that (34) is not veried.
Hence, since by construction of CDev; for C < CDev:
dF (max fx^e1 ;xI(xe1)g)
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2=1=2
<
dF (~xe1)
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2=1=2:
then it will always exist a xe1 2
 
1
2 ; x
max
eR

such that:
dF (max fx^e1 ;xI(xe1)g)
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2
=
dF (~xe1)
dxe1

xe1=1 xe2
(35)
that is, xe1 = 1  xe2 2
 
1
2 ; x
max
eR

is a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we need to show that a lower C
is associated with a Nash equilibrium where the di¤erence between the idiosyncratic preferences
of the editors hired by each media outlet, i.e., jxe1   xe2 j ; is higher. First of all by lemma 1, a
lower C corresponds to a higher xmaxeR and a lower x
min
eL
: Moreover, since as C decreases
d~xe(ne1 ;n

e1
)
dxe
increases, hence dF (~xe1 )dxe1

xe1=1 xe2
increases as well. Thus since the RHS of (35), the LHS must
increase as well, which, in turn implies that xe1 must be higher (similarly, xe2 will be lower). That
is, a lower C is associated with an equilibrium where the two media outlets choose less moderate
editors. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We have to analyze the no-deviation condition withK media outlets. Let ne =  ne be the stopping
thresholds chosen by a moderate editor. The demand media outlet 1 faces if it hires a moderate
editor as all the other media outlets is 8j 2 f2; 3; :::::;Kg:
DNDev(x1e) = D
NDev
 
xje

=
1
K
h
F ( ~xjxe= 12 )  F ( x^jxe= 12 )
i
=
2
K

F ( ~xjxe= 12 )  F (
1
2
)

Instead the demand that media outlet 1 faces if it deviates from such position is:
DDev(x1e) =
h
F ( ~xjx1e)  F (max fx^e1 ;xI(xe1)g)
i
Hence given a uniform distribution, media outlet 1 will prefer not to hire a moderate editor if and
only if:
K > K =
2
h
~xjxe= 12  
1
2
i
~xjx1e  max fx^e1 ;xI(xe1)g
where we know from the proof of proposition 3, that K > 2: Moreover, the game satises the
properties of Theorem 4 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b) for the existence of an equilibrium in
a product competition game. Hence, the K media outlets game possesses a symmetric mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover it is always the case thatdK

dC > 0 since x^e1 is increasing in C
and d~xe=dxe is decreasing in C: Q.E.D.
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